Chapter Title: Introduction

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

During the Cold War, U.S. national security policymakers had a single major objective: to contain the Soviet Union. U.S. Army forces were optimized to deter and, if necessary, defeat the Warsaw Pact adversaries in Central Europe, and Army International Activities (AIA) were focused on furthering this objective through cooperation with allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The post–Cold War strategic environment is more complex, however. Today, adversaries are often non-state entities, and operations feature coalitions of the willing, composed of both long-time allies and new partners, with a wide range of military strengths and weaknesses.

Such an environment has required that the Department of Defense (DoD) develop a more flexible and comprehensive security cooperation[1] strategy. The first step in this direction occurred in 1998 when Prioritized Regional Objectives in the Contingency Planning Guidance were expanded into Theater Engagement Plans. The second major step was the publication by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in 2003, of the first Security Cooperation Guidance,

[1] As employed by officials in the George W. Bush administration, security cooperation includes many, but not all, non-combat interactions between the U.S. Department of Defense and foreign military establishments: e.g., foreign military sales (FMS) and training, senior officer visits, and materiel technical cooperation. The term peacetime engagement, as used in the Clinton administration, was defined more broadly than security cooperation. The purpose of engagement was to shape the security environment, and its missions often included positioning U.S. military forces overseas and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

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which explicitly recognized the role of the military in shaping the international security situation in ways favorable to U.S. interests.

In recent years, a number of important steps have been taken to improve the planning and management AIA.[2] In particular, the Army International Activities Plan (AIAP), first published in 2002, raised the profile of AIA within the Army, offered strategic guidelines for using AIA to meet service- and national-level requirements, and helped to create a greater degree of coherence and identity within the disparate AIA community.

Still, the Army recognizes the need for a high-level assessment mechanism to allocate AIA resources more efficiently, execute AIA programs more effectively, and highlight the contributions of AIA to the Defense Strategy, the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance, and The Army Plan (TAP). For these reasons, in the fall of 2002, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G-3 asked the RAND Arroyo Center to develop a conceptual approach to assessing the value of the Army's non-combat interactions with other militaries. The study was to involve four major tasks:

- Elucidating the objectives or "ends" of AIA;
- Consolidating AIA into a manageable set of categories or "ways";
- Establishing linkages between AIA ends and ways through the development of short- and long-term assessment measures; and
- Designing a reporting tool for collecting measurement data from AIA programs[3] and security cooperation officials.

[2] Army International Activities are DoD security cooperation activities implemented by U.S. Army personnel.

[3] Currently, there is no standard definition for an AIA "program." Some programs have a dedicated manager at the HQDA or Major Command (MACOM) level. Other programs are managed within the Army in a decentralized fashion. Programs may be funded solely by the Army or may receive funding from Army or non-Army sources. "Program" and "activity" are terms often used interchangeably within the security cooperation community. We make a distinction between the two in this volume, however, intending that an activity be considered as a constituent element of a program.

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The hope is that the new assessment framework, which is presented in this document, will be integrated into future versions of the AIAP. A further hope is that this framework will also serve as the progenitor for a "family" of evaluation systems and that such systems will interconnect the major security cooperation players within DoD and, perhaps, the U.S. government.

Security Cooperation and U.S. Army International Activities

All of the U.S. uniformed services have a role in security cooperation, but the Army receives the lion's share of the resources[4] and has been at the forefront of building military-to-military relationships with global partners. This is in part because most countries have some kind of land force to cooperate with, although many partner countries also have an air force, navy, or some variation of these within a security service (e.g., a maritime component within the border guards).

The U.S. Army engages countries around the world through AIA, a large, umbrella-like collection of training, equipping, and consultative programs with multifaceted goals and purposes, whose execution is overseen within the Army Staff by the G-3 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Multinational Strategy and Programs Division, G-35-I (DAMO SSI) and within the Army Secretariat by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)).[5] AIA include courses offered at DoD's regional

[4] Because of the complexity of the programming and budgeting process with regard to Army International Activities, there has never been a complete accounting of the resources devoted to AIA. For a recent estimate, see Szayna et al. (2004).

[5] ASA(ALT) oversees U.S. Army-executed Title 22 Security Assistance (FMS, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), etc.), and cooperative Research and Development (R&D), as well as the Engineers and Scientist Exchange Program, the Foreign Comparative Test Program, among other programs. G-3 DAMO SSI is the overall AIA planner, integrator, and resource manager.

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centers,[6] international student programs at U.S. Army schools[7] and language institutes,[8] bi/multilateral military exercises, visits and exchanges, planning events, and other meetings involving U.S. Army officials.

Security cooperation activities executed by the Army range from capabilities-building activities through which training and equipment are provided, often via a bilateral or multilateral exercise, to familiarization activities that are not intended to build capabilities but, rather, to build trust, share information, promote mutual understanding of various issues, and discuss security concerns. Some examples of capabilities-building activities include Special Forces Joint and Combined Exchanges and Training (JCET) exercises, educational courses at DoD's regional centers and other U.S. military schools, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and FMF. Examples of familiarization activities include information exchanges, facilities visits, counterpart visits, and some conferences or seminars that are intended to provide training.

A simple categorization scheme for AIA developed by this project and explained in Chapter Three includes education and training, military exercises, military-to-military exchanges, defense and military contacts, international support and treaty compliance, standing forums, materiel transfer and technology training, and Research, Development, Technology, and Engineering (RDT&E) programs.

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[6] The regional centers are the Marshall Center (Garmisch, Germany), the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii), the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.), and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Washington, D.C.).

[7] Such as the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

[8] Such as the Defense Language Institute in Monterrey, California.

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Overview of U.S. Government Security Cooperation Planning

Army International Activities are planned and executed as part of a larger process whereby guidance is provided by policymakers and operationalized by program and activity managers in the Combatant Commands, the Component Commands, and the services.[9]

At the highest level, the U.S. Security Cooperation Strategy is derived from several key documents. Some of these come from the White House, e.g., the National Security Strategy (NSS) and periodic Executive Orders and functional National Campaign Plans. Others come from the Department of Defense: the Military Strategy (MS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG),[10] and the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG).[11] These documents are discussed in further detail in Chapter Two. The SCG in particular is now the capstone document for security cooperation. It incorporates information contained in the other key strategic documents.

Using the guidance provided through these key documents, DoD program/activity managers on the execution side then develop regional and country-specific plans to implement the provisions of the guidance. This is a relatively new process that is still being worked out. In the past, country-specific plans, called either the Defense or the Military Plan,[12] were more or less a listing of activities to be conducted during the coming year. Now, these country plans are more strategic; they include goals, objectives, activities, benchmarks for success, and resources. For all Combatant Commands, operationalization of the guidance is found in their regional Theater Security Co-

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[9] For a more detailed description of the security cooperation planning process, see Szayna et al. (2004).

[10] Before 2004, this document was known as the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

[11] Classification levels vary. The NSS, Executive Orders, MS, and the QDR are generally not classified, whereas the National Campaign Plans, SPG, and SCG are classified at the SECRET level.

[12] Joint Staff had country-specific Military Plans and OSD had Defense Plans.

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operation Strategy (TSCS), where specific activities and resources are aligned with DoD regional and country-specific objectives. Country-specific Campaign Plans are developed by the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands. For the services, specifically the Army, the guidance is operationalized in several planning documents, including TAP and the AIAP (see Figure 1.1). The AIAP is analogous to OSD's SCG and is influenced by, as well as acts as an input to, TAP.

Security cooperation officials within DoD make a concerted effort to link the guidance documents as closely as possible to their country plans in an effort to streamline activities, maximize program effectiveness, and minimize confusion. In practice, however, this is no easy task, since those on the implementation side often have multiple masters. Problems also arise when, for example, priority countries

Figure 1.1
AIA in Context



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requiring emphasis do not match up in the various strategy documents, making it difficult for implementers to know exactly where they should spend allotted resources. Moreover, in practice, chains of command are sometimes blurred, and personalities, as well as rapid job turnover rates from rotation, play an important role.

The current AIA assessment system is both complex and underdeveloped. Activity-reporting requirements are not institutionalized, and if they do exist, they tend to be stovepiped into the agency (or agencies) that provides the funding, has programmatic oversight, or has country/regional authority (see Figure 1.2). Army Functional Commands report to DAMO G-3 SSI on their non-security assistance AIA programs and to ASA(ALT) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on their security assistance programs. Within the regional Combatant Commands, country teams provide defense assessments of the activities within their purview, which they

Figure 1.2
Current AIA Reporting System



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provide to the Service Components and the Combatant Commands. For their part, Army Service Component Commands provide programmatic and country-level assessments to HQDA, the Combatant Commands, and DSCA. At present, there is no mechanism for providing AIA (or more generally, security cooperation) assessments to OSD and the Department of State, although OSD's Security Cooperation Guidance is calling for such a system to be established.

At the other end of the chain of command, AIA program managers often work in a vacuum, without full visibility into what other DoD agencies and offices are doing.

System for Measuring AIA Effectiveness

To maximize impact, avoid duplication of effort, and allocate limited resources, a rationale needs to be developed that explains how individual Army International Activities support strategic-level guidance. Moreover, the Army needs a system that allows policymakers, program managers, and implementers to make better decisions about whether ongoing activities should continue, cease, or change in some way. Although the Army International Activities Plan links AIA to larger national goals and guiding documents, the Army does not yet have a detailed, accessible, and adaptable tool for measuring whether International Activities are achieving the objectives identified by the AIAP. A rigorous evaluative framework for AIA—linked to an automated Army International Activities Knowledge Sharing System (AIAKSS)—would help program managers to allocate resources more effectively and assist Army and DoD policymakers in gaining a better understanding of AIA contributions to the National Security Strategy, Military Strategy, and OSD Security Cooperation Guidance objectives.[13]

[13] The conceptual framework proposed in this study builds on previous research conducted for the Army on methods for allocating resources to international activities in a more cost effective manner. See, for example, Szayna et al. (2001).

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To develop the rigorous framework just called for involves solving a number of problems. We have mentioned some of them above. A full checklist of such challenges would include: (1) the problem created by different stakeholders, with varying responsibilities for management and funding; (2) the issues raised by multiple objectives—of different types (e.g., short- versus long-term) and for different constituencies (e.g., political, diplomatic, and military); (3) the problem raised by a diversity of programs, which makes cross-program comparisons difficult; (4) the issue of causation, which involves determining whether particular programs, as opposed to other factors, actually produce intended effects; (5) the problem of "buy-in," which includes getting the wide variety of individuals responsible for implementing AIA programs to adopt an evaluation system that may not make their jobs easier; and (6) the measurement challenge, given that the achievement of some objectives (e.g., greater U.S. "access" to target countries) could prove difficult to measure quantitatively or even qualitatively.

Organization of the Document

This document is divided into seven chapters and one appendix. Following the introduction, Chapter Two reviews the literature on performance measurement in the public sector, surveys ongoing efforts to measure and assess the performance of security cooperation programs, and identifies the key features of our approach to AIA assessment. This chapter distinguishes between outputs and outcomes in efforts to measure performance and suggests that defining the outcome desired for any given AIA is key to the overall assessment process. Chapter Three explains our derivation of particular AIA objectives or "ends" from U.S. government, DoD, and Army documents. It also provides an explanation for various AIA categories or generic "ways" to achieve AIA ends. In the process, this chapter addresses and responds to the second and third challenges listed above. Chapter Four describes the process we have developed for linking AIA ends and ways. That process starts by defining the logic, including key

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theories, underlying the concept of security cooperation and then describes the steps we have taken to create AIA performance indicators and assessment measures. In this chapter, we present the remaining elements of our core methodology and explain how we propose to deal (i.e., interactively, for the most part) with the other four challenges listed above: the differences among AIA stakeholders, the issue of causation, the problem of buy-in, and the measurement challenge.

Chapter Five outlines the development of the AIAKSS—a web-based tool for collecting and reporting AIA information that is being made available to international program and command-level officials via Army Knowledge Online. In Chapter Six, we show the results of tests of our AIA assessment approach with officials at the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program, the Army Medical Department, and U.S. Army South. Chapter Seven describes lessons learned from our AIA assessment effort, potential ways to employ AIAKSS, and some obstacles to its full and effective employment. Finally, the appendix provides a complete listing of the performance indicators we developed in cooperation with AIA programs and security cooperation officials in HQDA G-3 and various Army commands.[14]

[14] The performance indicator listing in the appendix is a refinement of the listing provided in Annex D of the Army International Activities Plan (AIAP), Fiscal Years 2007–2008. The indicators in the appendix reflect what we learned from test cases conducted to investigate practical issues in implementing our assessment framework. The listing in Annex D of the AIAP is an earlier version prepared before completion of our test cases in the fall of 2004. The AIAP version of the indicator list is currently incorporated in the AIAKSS.

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