Chapter Title: Introduction

Book Title: Assessment of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity

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1. Introduction

Background on the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

History

On February 26, 2013, the White House released a policy statement on *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices* (IEDs), which stated that "IEDs remain one of the most accessible weapons available to terrorists and criminals to damage critical infrastructure and inflict casualties."[2] The statement concluded that, "the threat from IED use is likely to remain high in the coming decade and will continue to evolve in response to our abilities to counter them." However, as has been witnessed through the years—both in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom—this asymmetric threat is far from new.

In reaction to the growing threat posed by IEDs deployed by the Iraqi insurgency in 2003, GEN John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at the time, asked the Department of Defense (DoD) to initiate a "Manhattan like-Project"[3] to glean the expertise of all Services involved directly with countering IEDs. Initially, this led to the establishment of the Army IED Task Force in October 2003, which rapidly evolved into the Army-led Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT) in 2004 under former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.[4] In June 2005, acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon R. England established the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD TF) in reaction to the rise of casualties related to the Iraqi insurgency. This task force was then followed by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which was established on February 14, 2006.

JIEDDO Mission, Enduring Capabilities, and Lines of Operation

JIEDDO's mission is to focus, lead, advocate, and coordinate all DoD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs') and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.[5] This mission was to be accomplished through five enduring capabilities.

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[2] The White House, *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*, February 26, 2013

[3] John Barry et al. "Iraq's Real WMD," *Newsweek*, Vol. 147, No. 13, March 27, 2006, pp. 24–29.

[4] John Bokel, *An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization*, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2007.

[5] See Department of Defense Directive Number 2000.19E, *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization* (JIEDDO), February 2006.

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- **Rapid acquisition and fielding** is the scalable ability to employ authorities, flexible resources, streamlined processes, and effective oversight to drive the research and development community to rapidly anticipate, identify, develop, and integrate emerging technologies and concepts into effective fielded counter-IED (C-IED) solutions.
- **Operations-intelligence-information fusion and analysis** is an expeditionary and scalable network and analytical capability enabling DoD, other federal agencies, and coalition partners to understand threat-network activities globally. This fused, analytic capability leverages all available all-source information and intelligence to provide the most accurate, effective, time-sensitive information and counter-network support to CCDRs and, as authorized, other federal agencies.
- **Training** is the ability to develop, define, and set C-IED and attack-the-network training standards for Joint forces in response to CCDRs' requirements, as well as to integrate those standards into appropriate Joint and DoD concepts and doctrine in support of CCDR requirements to provide training and to build partner C-IED and counter-network capacity.
- **Weapons technical intelligence** is the ability to conduct relevant and timely collection, analysis, and technical and forensic exploitation of current and emerging IED technologies to swiftly enable force protection, component and materiel sourcing, targeting, countering of threat networks, and expeditious support to prosecution.
- **Whole-of-government approach** is the ability to rapidly synchronize counter-threat network capabilities and actions among Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, international, and other Federal agencies' C-IED stakeholders. This is done through collaborative planning, information sharing, and cooperative capability development to reduce the impact of IEDs on operational forces and the threat to the homeland.

These five enduring capabilities support three lines of operation (LOOs): Attack the Network (AtN), Defeat the Device (DtD), and Train the Force (TtF). A LOO is defined as a line "that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links the force with its base of operations and objectives."[6] JIEDDO uses these LOOs as a means of organizing initiatives and assigning responsibility for solutions. The main idea is to characterize activities by their contribution to C-IED efforts—either in preventing IEDs from reaching the battlefield, defeating devices placed on the battlefield, or specifically training the force in all aspects of C-IED operations. Although TtF deals most directly with training, all three have training aspects. The following sections will discuss each LOO in more detail.

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[6] See Army Doctrine Reference Publication, *Unified Land Operations*, No. 3-0, 4-22, May 16, 2012, p. 53: "Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Combined arms maneuver is often designed using lines of operations. These lines tie offensive and defensive tasks to the geographic and positional references in the area of operations."

Attack the Network (AtN)

The AtN LOO enables offensive operations against complex networks of financiers, trainers, and their supporting infrastructure. JIEDDO states that "Attack the Network is focused on information fusion, extensive partner collaboration, and expanding analytical support to combatant commands."[7] The intention is to disrupt networks that support IED use and prevent IEDs from reaching the battlefield.

Defeat the Device (DtD)

Countering the IED threat once it has been deployed requires an evolving set of technologies to combat the asymmetric threat posed by IEDs. As such, JIEDDO "provides technologies to detect IED components, neutralize the triggering devices, and mitigate the effects of an IED blast to ensure freedom of maneuver and effective operations for commanders" in theater.[8]

Train the Force (TtF)

TtF integrates elements of the other LOOs and focuses on improving the knowledge and proficiency of deploying forces. Initiatives in the AtN and DtD LOOs may drive a requirement for equipment training. Successfully carrying out AtN and DtD require a level of proficiency that TtF provides. Initiatives provided under TtF generally deal specifically with direct training programs or courses initiatives.[9] TtF is a multifaceted operation drawing both from lessons learned and from a working analysis of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In addition, JIEDDO has planned to "enhance its information sharing to U.S. allies by expanding the capabilities of its Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) and products provided COIC analysts in Coalition forces fusion centers in Afghanistan."[10] The TtF initiative incorporates AtN and DtD to better prepare warfighters with up-to-date information on specific operational theater asymmetric threats.

Organization

JIEDDO has unique organizational features that bear on the development of training programs and execution of training functions. JIEDDO employs approximately 2,700 military, government civilian, and DoD personnel. It is organized into four directorates (see Figure 1.1): (1) Directorate for Operations/Intelligence; (2) Directorate for Rapid Capability Delivery (DRCD); (3) Directorate for Training; and (4) Directorate for Information Enterprise

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[7] See JIEDDO Organization and Functions Guide (JOFG), April 2, 2013.

[8] JOFG, 2013.

[9] JOFG, 2013.

[10] JIEDDO, "JIEDDO Providing Training, Information & Technology Support to Coalition," news release, April, 26, 2010.

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Management.[11] The Directorate for Operations/Intelligence focuses on AtN. DRCD focuses on DtD but also supports TtF by managing and tracking C-IED solutions from beginning to delivery of capabilities. The Directorate for Training focuses on TtF through the Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) and manages the delivery of C-IED training solutions with DRCD. A fourth directorate, the Directorate for Information Enterprise Management, provides JIEDDO-wide information technology infrastructure and support, while the coordinating staff provides synchronization and support throughout the organization.

Figure 1.1
JIEDDO Organizational Structure

SOURCE: JOFG, 2013.

Need to Find Balance Between Oversight and Speed

There is an inherent tension between processes that protect against duplication and ensure value and processes that can provide a quick solution. The more reviews and oversight, the longer it will take to field solutions. Too much oversight cedes the advantage of asymmetric

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[11] JOFG, 2013.

warfare to the enemy. Training initiatives in particular need to reflect the latest information on enemy organization, tactics, and devices. Training is the major way to ensure that combatants do not go into harm's way with dated or inaccurate information. However, speed can also produce waste and/or ineffective solutions, and oversight is necessary to prevent this. The problem is in finding the right balance between oversight (to prevent waste and provide benefit) and speed (to prevent enemy advantage). JIEDDO uses the following processes to govern the organization and produce that balance.

JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process

The JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) is the overarching decisionmaking process that JIEDDO uses to select and approve initiatives. It was created "to respond to requirements and demands; to aggressively seek, acquire, and assess potential materiel, non-materiel, and training initiatives through extensive finding networks; to place proven C-IED capabilities in the hands of warfighters for evaluation and fielding; and transfer C-IED capabilities to Services or agencies."[12] JCAAMP also contains a number of processes that function to prevent duplication. For example, a number of teams and boards with decisionmaking power include Service representation, in part to ensure that initiatives are not already being implemented. Further discussion of the underlying processes is in Chapters Two and Three.

Transfer, Transition, Terminate, or Continue

JIEDDO uses the transfer, transition, terminate, or continue (T3C) process to limit the time horizon of initiatives and ensure that plans are established early in initiative development for disposition. T3C planning begins as soon as the initiative is begun and fixes a time in which JIEDDO must make a determination about whether a program should be terminated or continued in some form. Of note, the T3C plan is JIEDDO's plan for what should happen to the program, not a commitment from the affected Service. Thus, even if the plan calls for continuing the program, the Service is under no obligation to continue the training.

Joint Urgent Operational Need

A Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) is a request by a combatant commander for an urgent need for additional warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or contingency operations. A JUON is used if failure to deliver the capability requested will likely result in the inability of the unit to accomplish its missions or an increase the probability of casualties or loss of life. Thus, the JUON process has a goal of rapidly

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[12] JIEDDO, *Directorate for Rapid Capability Delivery (DCRD)*, briefing, April 30, 2013, slide 4, not available to the general public.

delivering a solution. JUONs are the primary means by which CCDRs request rapid response from the DoD requirements and acquisition process and are a major source for many JIEDDO initiatives, including some associated with requiring training.

The JUON process is administered by the Joint Staff J8 and has mechanisms to prevent duplication and ensure that Service solutions are properly considered. In fact, it goes beyond the JCAAMP process, requiring oversight and reach-back into the other Services to ensure that duplication is minimal or absolutely necessary. It requires each Service to coordinate and ensure that there are no duplicative capabilities.

Roles

Title 10 U.S.C. gives the Services the responsibility to organize, train, and equip for operations in different domains. The CCDRs define a requirement through the Joint Staff for the Services to prepare forces. The Services use the planning, programming, budget, and execution process; doctrine development; research; exercises; and several other functions to prepare forces to meet the needs of the CCDR. These are, by design, deliberate processes intended to preserve long-term Service investments, and they require a balance between portfolios. These processes—while effective for long-term force development—may not be rapid enough to respond to threats from a rapidly changing enemy and may not provide sufficient focus on immediate threats. JIEDDO was created with the capabilities and specific authorities to allow it to fill C-IED capability gaps.

Budgetary Authority

Service budget processes have a deliberate design and are subject to many internal controls, including a restriction on account usage. Research and development funding, for example, typically cannot be used for procurement or operations without explicit permission to reprogram. In contrast, JIEDDO receives "colorless" funding, which means it has flexibility to spend funds across traditional accounts, wherever it thinks it is most appropriate. This gives JIEDDO the ability to rapidly provide U.S. forces with equipment and training to defeat an enemy's asymmetric actions, but also reduces oversight over the larger process. JIEDDO funding processes reduce the possibility of duplication or waste by stipulating that the funds for an initiative expire after a three-year period.

Study Purpose

The RAND study team was asked to study whether there is duplication in training programs and functions and, if so, whether such duplication provides value. Specifically, this study supports the DoD response to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, which directed that "the Secretary of Defense shall prepare an assessment of the training-related activities of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

(JIEDDO) . . . [to] include all training programs and functions, both enduring and non-enduring, executed by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization in support of the United States Armed Forces"; and to "identify any program or function that is similar to or duplicates other training activities conducted elsewhere within the Department of Defense; and assess the value of maintaining such similarity or duplication."[13] For purposes of the study, training programs and functions are described below.

Training Programs

Training programs are discrete activities that are requested or initiated, planned, funded, and executed and contain a definable end state. They may be programs whose sole purpose is to train or they may be the training component of an equipment or systems development program.

Training Functions

Training functions are ongoing activities, as opposed to discretely initiated programs, inherent in JIEDDO's mission. A function is an activity that some organization performs, rather than initiates and plans. These broad activities include development of C-IED training strategies and programs. These include services that JIEDDO performs for other agencies and activities that JIEDDO uses to assess and develop capability. These are generally funded as part of JIEDDO's overall operational mission. Primary functions identified included the following:

- Advise and assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services on all matters related to the IED threat and its defeat, including training.
- Support Service and CCMD training activities by providing direct support, analysis, and subject-matter expertise. A key difference between the activities under this function and a training program is that training programs are subject to T3C and JIEDDO generally expects to continue these as long there is a need.
- Identify, develop, implement, assess, and, as appropriate, T3C C-IED training programs. Included in this function are several sub-functions, which we will consider separately.

Study Approach

To meet the study objective, the RAND team had extensive contact with OSD, the Services, and the different directorates within JIEDDO. The first task was to identify all the training programs and functions being carried out by JIEDDO. We requested this information from JIEDDO and received a comprehensive list of every initiative currently under way and separately developed a list of training-related functions being performed. The next task was to receive inputs from the Services on supposed areas of duplication and similarity. For programs, Service representatives were provided with the JIEDDO database and asked, based on their existing

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[13] Public Law 112-239, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, January 2, 2013.

Service programs and their attributes, whether the listed items constituted duplication. These representatives were drawn from the organizations within the Services specifically charged with C-IED capability development, as well as from the training establishments. They were nominated at the request of the Office for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and required to have flag-level review before submitting the inputs for the study. These representatives took the database provided by JIEDDO (contained in the Appendix) and then compared these to their own programs based on the attribute list developed by the RAND team and validated by the Services, USSOCOM, and JIEDDO. The RAND team took these inputs and performed its own assessments using the attributes and comparing the programs provided. These assessments were then provided to the Services and USSOCOM to ensure a correct understanding of the programs and the outcomes. In cases where enough attributes were identified as common to constitute complete or near duplication, the RAND team also assessed whether the duplication was limited in scope and duration—and likely to terminate in accordance with existing processes—and whether the duplication, even if sustained, might have value. Chapter Two contains tables discussing these results.

To evaluate functions, the Services were also asked to evaluate activities within JIEDDO. However, it became apparent that the attribute-based methodology would be less applicable and would have to rely more on a detailed examination of how JIEDDO executes these functions. While functions may look the same and contain many of the same attributes, the relevant feature is not the structure or appearance but the outcome. The RAND team performed this detailed assessment and reports the results in Chapter Three.

Organization of This Document

Chapters Two and Three contain our assessments of JIEDDO training programs and training functions, respectively, including a more detailed discussion of the methodology used. Chapter Four contains key findings from the two assessments and some overarching concluding thoughts. The Appendix is the list of JIEDDO initiatives either directed toward training or with training requirements associated with equipment or system development.