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Introduction

Alegal

Alegal. The simplest definition of this unusual term that will be developed throughout the pages of this book is as follows: that which is irreducible to a binary of legal versus illegal or extralegal. The “a” preceding “legal” is analogous to the “a” preceding “moral”; *alegal* is neither legal nor illegal/extralegal, just as *amoral* is neither moral nor immoral. The function of the “a,” therefore, does not refer to what or where the law is not: Words already exist for that—namely, “illegal,” meaning that which is *against* the law, such as a criminal act, or “extralegal,”¹ meaning that which is *outside* of the law, such as an area in which other states exercise extraterritoriality. Rather, what this enigmatic “a” gets down to is an incongruous relationship between the *alegal* and the law.

On the one hand, *alegal* is discontinuous with the law because it always exceeds its intelligibility. *Alegal* can exist in the absence of the law, but on the other hand, the law cannot exist without the *alegal*. This is because the law does not exist *a priori*; it is not a preestablished, positive, or natural entity that is set in stone from time immemorial. The law is something

that must be made up, and it is in the process of this fabrication that the alegal comes into play: Sovereign power arises by calibrating the infinite possibility of the alegal into a finite binary of legal versus illegal/extralegal. In other words, when Carl Schmitt defined the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception,”² he elucidated the ability to censor, exclude, or *except* an infinite array of possibilities so as to produce a spatiality (i.e., a *nomos*) in which territories become legible in terms of their legal codification. That which is irreducible to the law—the alegal—is drawn into a binary of the legal versus the illegal/extralegal.

The crisis of alegality, of that which is impervious to the law and hence a constant threat to sovereign power, is actually an enabling possibility, or a condition for the possibility of the emergence of sovereign power. Simply put, without the alegal, the sovereign would have nothing to do and no way to prove itself. Anyone can make up a law, but only sovereign power can enforce it through some form of complicity with the people, or a dynamic process called the “force of law.”³ In sum, the law, and by extension sovereign power, cannot obtain without the theoretical marker of the “a” in “alegal” that refers to not a property, but a performative operation of the calibration-*cum*-containment of the infinite possibility of the alegal into a legal intelligibility.

This distinction between the law as an *a priori* given of a static entity and an *a posteriori* effect of a performative operation is crucial for telling the story of miscegenation between U.S. military personnel and local women in Okinawa. Okinawa, also known as the Ryukyu Islands, is an archipelago that lies south of Kyushu, Japan, and east of Taiwan. Although it is but a few speckles on the world map, its geopolitical significance is enormous. Within the context of the United States, many have heard of Okinawa either through the news or through firsthand knowledge of it in relation to the U.S. military. This is for good reason. The United States has the most powerful military in world history, and Okinawa arguably has the most intense concentration of U.S. military bases in the world.⁴ Put in numbers, this means that 46,334 active duty members of the U.S. armed forces (military personnel), civilian components (foreign civilians who are employed by the U.S. armed forces), and dependents (family members of the U.S. armed forces)⁵ roam these tiny tropical islands of approximately 1.4 million people.⁶ And they have been doing so for over the past seventy years since the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. Although women are increasingly represented in the armed forces, they still only make up about 16 percent of the military today.⁷ Rather, a predominantly male institution founded on a culture of hypermasculinity is put into contact with an

island people who have historically been subject to a feminizing Orientalist gaze. As a result, stories about Okinawa in the United States often circulate around contentious sexual encounters between U.S. military personnel and local Okinawans. The widely reported rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three U.S. military personnel in 1995 was but one chapter in a never-ending story that founds the U.S.-Okinawan relationship.

The central concern of this book is how American-Okinawan sexual encounters and, by extension, miscegenation become problematically narrated through a certain grammar governing trans-Pacific discourse, that is, the grammar of international law. The term “miscegenation” originates in the context of adjudicating the legality of interracial sex between whites and blacks in the United States.⁸ Within the context of this book, miscegenation is defined as any type of sexual encounter between U.S. military personnel or their affiliates and local Okinawans that could (although not inevitably) result in the birth of mixed-race offspring.⁹ In line with scholarship on critical race and postcolonial theory, this book does not assume that miscegenation is simply the mixing of subjects based upon sexual, racial, and national difference. Quite the contrary, it is examined as the performative process through which these differences become established as an effect of the contested encounter. While the politics of sex and race are predominant in mixed-race studies in the United States, the politics of national difference are exaggerated in discourses surrounding American-Okinawan miscegenation precisely because of Okinawa’s precarious position vis-à-vis international law.

For starters, many today are still unclear about Okinawa’s geopolitical disposition. U.S. military personnel commonly refer to Okinawa as the “Rock” and have thought of it as a giant U.S. military base protruding out of the Pacific Ocean instead of a group of Japanese islands that happen to contain U.S. military bases. Flights from China or Taiwan to Okinawa, furthermore, will be listed in the Chinese characters “琉球,” reflecting a historical understanding of the area as a state that paid tribute to imperial China before it was annexed by Japan and turned into “Okinawa Prefecture” in 1879. In prewar Japan, public establishments often hung signs stating “No Koreans or Ryukyans Allowed,” while in postwar Japan, many mainlanders have assumed Okinawans can speak English because of the densely concentrated U.S. military presence. This differential treatment oddly coexists along with the official textbook answer to Okinawa’s geopolitical disposition that it is one of the forty-seven prefectures of the Japanese state.

Okinawa’s geopolitical ambiguity becomes a central concern for miscegenation because every time the law is evoked to adjudicate a sexual

transgression, the question of Okinawa's very relationship to the law is thrown open to inquiry. Yes, the U.S. military may have infringed upon the law, but the law of . . . what state? As this book will show, interlocutors across the Pacific have gone to great lengths to make Okinawa fit into the system of international law by arguing that the U.S. military infringes upon *Japanese* sovereignty in Okinawa. In this bilateral configuration, the irreducible third space of Okinawa is but a subset of Japan in its relation to the United States. However, the problem is that Okinawa has always existed in a semi-colonial relationship with Japan and has never enjoyed the full protection of Japanese sovereignty. In fact, as this book will show, the greatest irony of this claim lies in the history of Japan's attempt to protect the sexual and racial integrity of so-called pure Japanese women and, by extension, its political sovereignty by sacrificing Okinawa to the United States so it could serve as a military outpost for a purportedly "mono-ethnic" Japanese state. Hence, different from literature predicated on the bilateralism of international law whereupon an American empire of military bases violates the sovereignty of its military colony in Japan, this book instead examines how both actors in the United States and Japan collaboratively translate Okinawa's a legality into the grammar of international law. By positioning Okinawa in terms of the alegal, this book therefore refuses to allow sovereignty to seduce it into a legal discourse so it can be manhandled by its trans-Pacific keepers.

In this way, Okinawa's a legality is not positioned vis-à-vis only the United States, but vis-à-vis the United States, Japan, and the larger network of global sovereignty that they constitute together. As shown in the next section, the so-called Okinawan problem is not about its denial or recuperation of sovereignty. More than anything, it is about the exercise of a particular kind of legal discourse—whether coded as a state that violates sovereignty (United States) or a state whose sovereignty is violated (Japan)—that allows for Okinawa's a legality to be collaboratively managed according to the whims of American militarism and the Japanese political economy. The next section introduces how this trans-Pacific triangulation operates through the problem of miscegenation.

Triangulation

On March 25, 1952, Takada Nahoko, a member of the Japanese Socialist Party, delivered a passionate speech before the Japanese Diet. Referring to the so-called occupation baby—that is the offspring of U.S. soldiers and mainland Japanese women—she proclaimed, "the atomic bomb is not the

only thing that can destroy a race.”¹⁰ The United States had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki just six-and-a-half years earlier that decimated the civilian population in what many believed was an act of genocide. Takada evoked these still fresh wounds in order to portray a second genocide perpetrated not by bombs during the war, but by U.S. soldiers during the occupation accused of sexually contaminating a purportedly pure Japanese population and producing a generation of mixed-race children. Her use of this term “occupation baby” to allude to the lives yet to come was politically charged because, technically speaking, the Allied occupation of Japan was about to end a month later on April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was to go into effect. At the time of her speech, Japan was on the eve of its liberation as a sovereign state with a U.S. military presence that would go on to be operated under the auspices of the accompanying U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. By suggesting that Japan would continue to be occupied nonetheless, Takada argued that irrespective of the formalities of international law, the ongoing U.S. military base presence would be evidence of Japan’s compromised sovereignty and that the threat it faced therein took multiple forms, including a sexual one. At that time, many Japanese leftists claimed that the Administrative Agreement (renewed as the Status of Forces Agreement in 1960) referred to in Article 3 of the 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty granted the U.S. military impunity from Japanese law and therefore conferred extraterritorial status. This meant that U.S. military personnel were able to conduct military operations without the hassles of interference from the Japanese government and were also given free rein to commit egregious crimes such as rape without fear of punishment under Japanese law. Takada added a gendered perspective to this criticism of extraterritoriality by attacking what I call “extraterritorial miscegenation.” This refers to sexual assault, prostitution, and even so-called free-will romantic relationships between U.S. military personnel and Japanese women that purportedly take place in the absence of full protection under Japanese sovereignty and often lead to the birth of “occupation babies.”

Takada’s speech was a harbinger of the troubled politics of sex and race that continue to haunt postwar Japan today. Her valiant resistance to racialized sexual oppression by the U.S. military certainly resonates with contemporary transnational feminist movements against militarized violence. Yet, at the same time, her reduction of the “occupation baby” to a bilateral U.S.-Japan issue problematically leaves out the entire postcolonial legacy of Japan’s multiethnic empire. Behind this omission lies a story to what will become, following Takada’s demands, a systematic containment

of the production of the “occupation baby” in mainland Japan that is intimately connected with the elimination of its imperial legacy. The voice of this story comes from the islands of Okinawa which, as the final destination of mainland Japan’s unwanted miscegenation, became the vanishing point between Japan’s multiethnic imperial past and its monoethnic democratic future.

This story began when the U.S. military moved into the vacuum opened up by the collapse of Japanese empire and found an opportunity to actualize its role as a leader on the stage of world history. The coast was clear for the American hegemon; across the Atlantic, Europe waned as the center of power as it was devastated by war and deteriorated from successive waves of colonial liberation.¹¹ Across the Pacific, the fallen Japanese empire offered access to the infinite potential of Asian markets. The problem, however, was how to access these markets without resorting to outright colonization. Given the principle of nonterritorial aggrandizement of the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the Cairo Declaration (1943), outright colonial rule was not only politically unfashionable, but also administratively unfeasible. For a solution, the U.S. military did what any other corporation would do after accomplishing a hostile takeover: Look to its predecessor for guidance.

The U.S. military sought to reinstate a modified version of the prized project of late Japanese empire known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In place of a spread of formal and informal colonies that were now allowed to openly display their animus for their former imperial master, came a network of U.S. military bases committed to forming a regional trading bloc centered on the reemergence of the Japanese economy. This new arrangement avoided charges of colonialism—both old and new—as the incoming U.S. military claimed to liberate each area from the clutches of Japanese colonialism in the name of ethnic “self-determination” for all peoples based upon notions of national essence.¹² What emerged was the blueprint for a network of racialized territorial sovereignties across the Asia Pacific that revolved around a core of white supremacy in the U.S. synced to the “myth of monoethnicity” (*tan’itsuminzoku no shinwa*)¹³ in Japan.

The so-called occupation baby was the discursive bond that held the racial politics of the U.S. and Japan together through a process of mutual exclusion. It was shunned by the U.S. at a time when anti-miscegenation laws were still in effect in the white-supremacist American fatherland. It was also shunned by Japan at a time when the popularization of the myth of monoethnicity was instrumental in suppressing the legacy of its multiethnic empire. The outcry against extraterritorial miscegenation is but one example of the multiethnicity of Japanese empire being suppressed in the

name of protecting the purported purity of the Japanese race against racial mixing with U.S. military personnel.¹⁴ The greatest irony, of course, is that while protest appeared to attack the U.S., it was entirely consistent with the U.S. military's common interest in eliminating the residual illegality from Japanese empire, or in other words, the multitude of subjects who were ethnically, linguistically, and/or culturally heterogeneous and unable to "return" to essentialist notions of a pre-imperial identity at the tap of a magic wand. Whether coded as for or against the integrity of Japanese sovereignty, both discourses unwittingly reinforced the assumption of its ethnic purity at the expense of obscuring *how* Japan was able to shed its multiethnic colonial legacy and emerge as a sovereign state in 1952. One answer to this "how" is none other than Okinawa.

It is well known that through the 1947 "Emperor's Message," Hirohito offered Okinawa to serve as a U.S. military outpost in exchange for the eventual recuperation of Japanese sovereignty.¹⁵ But this was only the beginning. Takada's speech delivered after the Allied occupation in 1952 was an early indication of what was to come. She continued, "In order to protect the purity of Japan, this contamination cannot be washed out until all foreign troops are turned away."¹⁶ In the decade following her statement, activists across mainland Japan launched a largely victorious anti-base movement that was animated by protest against extraterritorial miscegenation. Chapter 1 details how U.S. military facilities in mainland Japan were reduced to one-quarter of their original size in the late 1950s, only to reappear in Okinawa where 70 percent of all U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated even though the prefecture makes up only 0.6 percent of total state territory today. And with these facilities followed a culture of miscegenation. Today, the percentage of international marriage (between an American citizen groom and Japanese national bride) and mixed heritage birth (between an American citizen father and Japanese national mother) in Okinawa Prefecture is approximately five times that of the national average.¹⁷

Whereas Japan was able to displace the discord with U.S. military bases onto Okinawa, I argue that the relationships engendered by sexual encounters and the resulting mixed-race offspring in these islands embody a fundamental aporia within the U.S.-Japan network of global sovereignty: Both are at once the purported evidence of Japan's victimization by the United States that bore upon their transfer to Okinawa, and at the same time, both are the impediments to Okinawa's ability to become fully integrated into a monoethnic Japan as first-class nationals. Setting aside the legacy of Japanese racism toward the "darker," "hairier," and "more barbaric" Okinawan, one can see that the mixed-race subject is an unsightly reminder

of Okinawa's inability to "become Japanese,"¹⁸ hence suggesting the reason for the choice of Okinawa as a place to concentrate U.S. military bases in the first place. And while one may certainly argue that the myth of monoethnicity has given way to a more politically correct climate of multiculturalism in the post-reversion era, the celebration of mixed-race Okinawan entertainers in Japanese popular culture today has done little to extricate Okinawa from its exceptional status. When the mixed-race queen of Japanese pop Amuro Namie sang "Never End" at the 2000 G8 summit in Okinawa, many Okinawans wondered if she was singing about the never-ending U.S. military presence on her native islands.

The question of miscegenation in Okinawa begs for an examination of the biopolitical dimensions to the U.S.-Japan network of global sovereignty. That is, what is the particular logic of population management in postwar Japan that benefited from U.S. military bases only insofar as the burden of the physical presence of the bodies that operate them was exported to Okinawa? It will be helpful to consider how biopolitics in Japan, as a continuing trajectory from the prewar era, came to terms with the postwar U.S. military basing project for the purposes of framing the rest of this book. While the U.S. military presence was useful to the continued development of the postwar Japanese economy, the next section resurrects discussions on biopolitics put forth by Marxian scholars in prewar Japan to suggest that miscegenation posed a threat to the continued growth of the Japanese middle class formed along the lines of patriarchal monoethnic normativity.

Biopolitical State

The variety of biopolitics referenced in this book is perhaps closest to the thread Michel Foucault explored in his 1978–1979 *Birth of Biopolitics* lectures delivered at the Collège de France. It was there that he brought biopolitics most intimately into the heart of sovereignty and illuminated a groundbreaking theoretical shift from sovereignty keyed to reason of the state (*raison d'État*) to sovereignty keyed to reason of the market, or what I call a "biopolitical state."

After the 1917 October Revolution, mounting economic unrest threatened states around the world with instability and drove a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between the state and capitalism from the perspective of a new political actor that Foucault, in a larger trajectory, would go on to identify as the population. In this vein, he traced developments in the United States amidst the Great Depression to the U.S. military occupa-

tion of the Anglo-American German Bizona after World War II. The crisis that assaulted Japanese empire, however, was already unfolding over a decade earlier. Japan was hit with a series of rice riots in 1918, the emergence of Korean independence movements in 1919, and mass unemployment on an unprecedented scale after the manufacturing boom of World War I.¹⁹ How would Japan amend the relationship between the disproportionately large number of farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises on the one hand, with a small handful of giant *zaibatsu*²⁰ that monopolized capital on the other, precisely at the moment when Japan was being inundated with colonial surplus populations from the corners of its empire?

Living these historical conditions in real time, Marxian scholars in Japan such as Uno Kōzō and Tosaka Jun started to theorize biopolitics long before Foucault, even if they did not use the term. Uno reconceptualized the “law of population” (*jinkō hōsoku*)²¹ by problematizing the limitations of “finance capital” and its perceived corrective, i.e., the “controlled economy” (*tōsei keizai*) of a socialist state.²² Because capitalists assumed a constant reserve of labor power ready for consumption, they paid little heed to unemployment in times of recession and dismissed it as a problem to be corrected by the “mechanism of the commodity economy.”²³ But when economic depression threatened social unrest on a global scale, the continued flow of labor power could no longer be taken for granted. The reproduction, management, and commodification of labor power became a central conundrum for the biopolitical state. The conundrum, he argued, is that capital is contingent on labor power for its continued operation, but at the same time “labor power cannot be produced as a commodity by capital.”²⁴ How would this “impossibility” (*muri*) be overcome?

Uno argued that the state needed to assume the role of organizing the population for the commodification of labor power through “social policy” (*shakai seisaku*),²⁵ or what Michel Foucault would go on to identify as “institutional frameworks”²⁶ over twenty years later. This is the first characteristic of a biopolitical state. He writes that “states were naturally compelled to intervene to some degree” to the “vast number of unemployed workers” since it could “no longer simply leave it to the mechanism of the commodity economy.”²⁷ In this context, Tomiyama Ichirō and Katsuhiko Endo have respectively argued that the state intervened with spending policies to regulate the production of surplus populations in agrarian villages²⁸ and foster the development of small and medium-sized enterprises as the “primary absorbers of the relative surplus population” through “industrial policy” and “administrative guidance.”²⁹ Ken C. Kawashima and Tomiyama have respectively shown how surplus populations from

Korea and Okinawa became racialized as cheap labor against the formation of an ethnically “Japanese” middle class.

Yet, while social policy was essential, Uno himself writes that “it could not provide a fundamental solution to the problem.”³⁰ When taken to the extreme, social policy could result in a controlled economy of a socialist state such as that of Nazi Germany that ended in ruins.³¹ In his study on the development of social policy in the interwar period, Katsuhiko Endo reads Uno alongside Tosaka Jun to trace the emergence of a second, more essential component of the biopolitical state. That is, “socialism as idealism,”³² or the ideological structure of a different kind of “socialist state” that serves a “new form of capitalism.”³³ Common to Uno and Tosaka is an emphasis on the formation of a middle class that overcomes the contradictions of capital present in everyday life through service to the ideal of a Japanese state. At the risk of being reductive, this means that the middle class took upon itself the task of managing the reproduction of labor power in service to the state for capital.

Tosaka argues that the Japanese middle class was at the heart of the ideological form of “Japanism” (*Nipponshugi*) that inspired wartime fascism. Not only was it the primary beneficiary of social policy, but it came to see the biopolitical state as an ideal that would protect it from the greed of monopoly capitalism and, hence, internalized the need to protect it from perceived threats. In this way, Tosaka, in a similar vein as Foucault, introduced the biopolitical mechanism of social defense. Foucault wrote that the “[p]olice is a set of interventions” that “ensure that living . . . can in fact be converted into forces of the state,” or in other words, ensure that all life “will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of the state’s forces.”³⁴ In his essay on what Tosaka called the “*spirit of policing*,”³⁵ Kawashima goes a step beyond Foucault and shows not only how the police function shifted to transform the act of living into a state force, but also how this function came to be internalized by the masses, or what he calls the “massification of the police, and the policification of the masses.”³⁶ For Kawashima, the police function dispersed throughout the masses, aimed to care for and discipline life so that certain populations deemed “unproductive and superfluous to capitalist production . . . did not interrupt the process of commodifying labor power. . . .”³⁷ Endo further articulates this deadly mechanism as the “working class desire to become a member of a community of the same that enables the State to utilize violence against those who are ‘different,’ and who threaten to cause social disorder. . . .”³⁸ This means that the “working class” targets life that is unintelligible to the biopolitical state as a matter of its own survival. By doing so, Tosaka

writes that “[f]ascism is precisely the political mechanism that” ironically becomes useful to “monopoly capitalism” by taking “advantage of the petit bourgeois, or the middle class in the broad sense.”³⁹ This is why he locates the heart of fascism in the “various medium-scale farmers, or the rural middle class” that subscribed to idealist notions surrounding “feudalism” such as “agrarianism” and “familialism.”⁴⁰

It is at this juncture that biopolitics intersects most intimately with the sovereign decision: Capital is contingent upon the integration of something both irreducible and external to it (i.e., labor power), just as sovereignty is contingent upon the integration of something both irreducible and external to it (i.e., the alegal). The commodification of labor power comes together with the sovereign decision to translate an unintelligible life force into units of “difference” that become intelligible to the state for consumption. In this way, the sovereign decision is not monopolized by the state, but as Stephen Legg writes in his rendering of the biopolitical dimension of sovereignty, it becomes the “prerogative of the swarming sovereigns within the population.”⁴¹

While the ascent of the Japanese middle class had already set afoot before the end of the war, the economic reforms of the Allied occupation expedited correctives to the limitations of Japanese empire and allowed for its full-fledged emergence in the postwar era. The passage of the 1945 Labor Union Law that guaranteed workers the right to organize, engage in collective bargaining, and strike,⁴² and measures taken in 1946 to dissolve the *zaibatsu*⁴³ widened the possibility for workers to take on a central role organizing capitalist production. In an essay written one year into the occupation, Uno identified the reemergence of biopolitics under the name “industrial democratization.”⁴⁴ He argued for a two-way street in which the worker weighs in to the production process and, by doing so, becomes vested in seeing that capital makes returns to the very workers responsible for its growth so as to avoid the catastrophe of unemployment. Hence, more than simple state intervention into industries from above, he argued for a “management of capital by the state [that] is surveiled and reined in by a powerful organization of workers.”⁴⁵

In this way, Uno not only provided a preview, but also a biopolitical backstory to what Chalmers A. Johnson would go on to call the “developmental state”⁴⁶ that intervened into industry in order to achieve “substantive social and economic goals,”⁴⁷ or what Bruce Cumings would go on to discuss as “administrative guidance” that shaped prewar colonial society as much as it did postwar Japanese society.⁴⁸ As Johnson notes, these industries were interfaced with social policies starting with the “three

sacred treasures” of the lifetime employment system, the seniority wage system, and enterprise unions that made the success of the industry integral to the very stability of the worker’s life. Work, then, was not a nine to five job, but an economic expression of nationalism for which they were quite literally willing to die for through overwork or *karōshi*. Hence, as subject and object of industrial production, work became a holy mission for the state, for the company, and for the family—that is, the Japanese middle-class family as the very locus of the reproduction of labor power at its most literal level.

Scholars such as Johnson and Cumings have tracked the continuity of state-implemented economic and social policies from the prewar to the postwar period. Although not comprehensive, the implementation of major institutional frameworks designed to foster a mutually beneficial relationship between the U.S. military and the Japanese economy are traced in this book, with focus on the management of sex around U.S. military bases. While it is useful to understand how these institutional frameworks became implemented from above, this book does not address them as part of a comprehensive empirical history. Rather, this book contributes a study of the second component of the biopolitical state: how sovereign power dispersed through the Japanese middle class governed by norms of mono-ethnicity continued to target life unintelligible to the state from below as a *cultural* problem. Of course, the life that this book is most interested in is Okinawan life and, more specifically, Okinawan life at its most extreme point of unintelligibility—in the embrace of miscegenation.

The *alegal* that names this book, hence, is not just a state that is excluded from sovereign power, but it is more fundamentally a form of life that exists in a condition of unintelligibility to the biopolitical state. Furthermore, this unintelligibility is not reduced to the finality of a death sentence. In other words, *Alegal: Biopolitics and the Unintelligibility of Okinawan Life* is not an elegy that laments the tragedy of a people excluded by sovereign power. Certainly, Okinawans have endured unspeakable acts of violence and continue to live with them in their daily lives. Yet, as Ariko Ikehara writes, Okinawans “neither reject nor accept their lives, but cope with and negotiate the mundane in making life possible. . . .”⁴⁹ To cope means to develop a strategy for living in the here and now, or what Ikehara calls a negotiation with the “mundane.”⁵⁰ This book looks in unexpected places to articulate this philosophy of coping so distanced from the ideal of the state that it is compelled to enhance its life force by other means. It traces the excess of a life force that cannot be contained by the state, the capacity

of that life force to transform the world in the absence of self-determination, and the attempt to reclaim autonomy from the biopolitical state that monopolizes it.

Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 1 on mainland Japan in the 1950s and Chapter 2 on Okinawa from 1945 to 1952 contextualize the respective responses to U.S. military bases in both locations in terms of debates surrounding sex work that catered to the U.S. military. These two chapters act as complementary opposites: Chapter 1 depicts the success of Japan's anti-base protest as symbolic in structure, while Chapter 2 depicts Okinawa's failings of the same as allegorical in structure. Chapter 1 specifically shows how activists and politicians in mainland Japan launched a largely victorious anti-base movement in which they protested "extraterritorial miscegenation" as the racial contamination of the Japanese nation through the literary genre of reportage. It reads this reportage alongside Tosaka's description of protest toward private prostitution in the context of prewar Japan, where he located the formation of "familialism" (*kazokushugi*) as the symbolic substitution of the family for the state. Chapter 2, by contrast, shows how Okinawans, surviving in a vacuum of sovereignty in the immediate postwar, had no choice but to eke out life with an all-encompassing U.S. military presence. It shows how their historical failure to be included in the biopolitical order in the prewar era informed a tenuous and duplicitous attitude toward sovereign power in the postwar era. Okinawans did not experience a sense of loss of sovereign power that was assumed by mainland Japanese interlocutors discussed in Chapter 1, but rather a continuing fear of being excluded from the biopolitical order in which they were exposed to the ongoing brutalities of death and sexual violence. This fear informed an instrumental obedience to the legal order that could be reinforced just as easily as it could be disarticulated. Instead of judging Okinawan complicity or resistance to the postwar order from the seat of sovereign power, Chapter 2 reads the failure of recognition by, and failure of identification with, sovereign power in terms of Benjamin's notion of allegory. Allegory, for Benjamin, is the antidote for symbol, and it attempts to forge a different relationship with transcendental power. It does not assume that Okinawa's failure to become sovereign subjects before the law is disempowering, but instead seeks to reclaim the field of Okinawa's alegality implied by failure as the place of the political.

Chapter 3 on Okinawa during the period of the all-island struggle from 1952 to 1958, and Chapter 4 on Okinawa during the reversion era from 1958 to 1972, both show the limitations of resistance toward an assumed single-state imperialism and instead depict Okinawa within a U.S.-Japan led postwar regionalism. These two chapters are also complementary in that both describe how workers in the base towns centered on the sex industry became impediments to the Old Left's attempt to unify behind a Japanese ethnic nation (Chapter 3), and the New Left's attempt to unify behind a Japanese proletarian class (Chapter 4). Chapter 3 reads the sex worker as a lumpenproletariat subject who constantly fails representation before the state, and it reads the potentiality for this kind of subject to inspire political transformation amongst the masses through the story of Okinawa's underground communist party. Chapter 4 reads literary and filmic representations of the sex worker allegorically in order to question the ways it is possible to hear her speak. It shows how the one segment of Okinawan society that came to be despised for its inability to be mobilized into anti-military protest became the very spontaneous agents who led a moment of unplanned anti-military violence during the Koza Riot.

During the period between 1972 and 1995, discussed in Chapter 5, the complicity between U.S. militarism and the Japanese political economy became unavoidably clear and prompted many Okinawans to conceptualize a different kind of autonomy unmoored from promises of the Japanese state. This was also a time when the anti-prostitution law went into effect in Okinawa, and mixed-race individuals born to U.S. military personnel and Okinawan women started to come of age and speak for themselves. In place of self-determination that is predicated on the stability of a unified self or unified nations as the precondition for individual agency or state sovereignty, Chapter 5 considers a different sense of agency implied by morphing matter. This refers to the material dimensions of Okinawa as a borderland of the Pacific, where bodies continually mix. It does this through a close reading of a rare published mixed-race memoir to show how the author documents her failure to unify as a subject before the state. This failure leads her to a different way to appreciate her life, not as a material object that unifies as a subject before the state, but in the character of its mutability that disengages the force of sovereign power. In this way, life comes to *matter* for herself and not for the state.